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Abstract 
Purpose - This paper empirically examines the effect of developer charges on housing affordability in 
Brisbane, Australia.  Developer paid fees or charges are a commonly used mechanism for local 
governments to pay for new urban infrastructure.  Despite numerous government reports and many 
years of industry advocacy, there remains no empirical evidence in Australia to confirm or quantify 
passing on of these charges to home buyers.  
Design/methodology/approach  - This research applies a hedonic house price model to 4,699 new and 
25,053 existing house sales in Brisbane from 2005 to 2011.  
Findings – The findings of is research are consistent with international studies that support the 
proposition that developer charges are over passed.  This study has provided evidence that suggest 
developer charges are over passed to both new and existing homes in the order of around 400%.  
Research limitations/implications - These findings suggest that developer charges are thus a 
significant contributor to increasing house prices and reduced housing affordability.   
Practical/Social Implications: By testing this effect on both new and existing homes, this research 
provides evidence in support of the proposition that not only are developer charges over passed to new 
home buyers but also to buyers of existing homes.  Thus the price inflationary effect of these developer 
charges are being felt by all home buyers across the community, resulting in increased mortgage 
repayments of close to $1000 per month.   
Originality/value - This is the first study to empirically examine the impact of developer charges on 
house prices in Australia. These results are important as they will inform governments on the 
outcomes of growth management strategies on housing affordability, providing the first evidence of its 
kind in Australia. 
Keywords - Housing affordability, developer charges, impact fees, house prices, growth management 
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1. Introduction 
Housing is widely regarded as the largest investment most Australians make in their 
lifetime, however despite all levels of government having housing affordability policies, 
housing affordability remains at critical levels (Demographia, 2013).  At the same 
time, the provision of new urban infrastructure in growing communities has been a 
policy dilemma for governments since the 1950s (Neutze, 1995).  On one hand, 
governments may appease existing residents by shifting the responsibility of funding 
new growth related infrastructure from the government to the development industry 
(Burge, 2008); however on the other hand, the passing on of these costs to new 
homeowners is said to directly contribute to reduced housing affordability (Been, 
2005).   
 
There is an extensive body of international literature that discusses the passing on (to 
home buyers) or passing back (to the englobo land seller) of developer charges (Nelson 
et al., 2008).  Regardless of the direction of passing and the various market elasticities, 
in the long term the outcome appears inevitable that house prices rise as a result of 
developer charges (Been, 2005).  The question that remains in debate is:  how much do 
developer charges increase house prices by?  In a climate where housing affordability 
is a policy objective for many governments (Queensland Government, 2007) a clear 
understanding of the impacts these government charges have on the price and supply 
of new housing is imperative.  Despite over a dozen separate studies over two decades 
in the US on this topic, no empirical works have been carried out in Australia to test if 
similar shifting or overshifting occurs here.  This research seeks to close that 
knowledge gap through hedonic modelling of developer charges and house prices using 
data from Brisbane, Queensland.   
 
The term “Developer Charges” is a term that is used to encompass the estimated 
proportionate cost of providing trunk and other off site urban infrastructure such as 
local roads, stormwater and community facilities and parks to new developments.  It is 
a one off charge levied on the developer by the local authority, generally at the time of 
rezoning/planning approval (Been, 2005, Burge, 2008, Campbell, 2004, Mathur et al., 
2004, Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004, Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003, Bryant 
and Eves, 2014). 
 
These costs historically were raised through general revenue, however in high growth 
areas existing home owners have been increasingly reluctant to fund the 
infrastructure requirements of new development (Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003). 
Hence developer charges were introduced to shift these costs to the private sector  
(Burge, 2005).  Around the globe, various terminologies are used to describe what are 
essentially urban infrastructure funding mechanisms.  For example, the term “Impact 
Fees” is used throughout the majority of the US, “Development Charges” is prominent 
in Canada, “Planning obligation”, “planning gain” or “Section 106 agreements” are all 
terms used today to describe the equivalent to an infrastructure charging system in 
the UK (Evans, 2004). “Exactions” is a general term used in Indian (3iNetwork) and 
some American literature, whilst in Australia “Developer Charges”, “Infrastructure 
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Charges”, “Developer Contributions” or “Development Levies” are largely 
interchangeable terms depending on the jurisdiction.   
 
This introductory section sets the background for this topic.  The following section 
details the relevant literature, whilst the third section outlines the methodology used 
for this research.  The forth section presents the data, with the results to follow, and 
the last section concludes. 
2. Literature 
Internationally, the issue of developer charges and the impact on house prices is 
widely documented.  Developer charges were originally intended to transfer the 
burden of infrastructure provision in high growth areas from the public purse on to 
developers (Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003).  However, in a competitive market  the 
theoretical literature is consistent in its conclusions that despite market conditions 
developer charges are passed onto home buyers in the long run and will thus lead to 
increased housing prices (Been, 2005, Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003, Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessy, 2004, Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 2006).   
 
This theoretical concept is consistently captured by a vast number of academics, 
particularly in the US and Canada over the past three decades.  With supporting 
theoretical literature dating back to the 1970’s, current international literature now 
largely assumes it as a given that developer charges increase the price of new housing 
in the long run (Productivity Commission, 2011). 
 
If the theoretical work is largely consistent in its conclusions that developer charges 
lead to increased housing prices, the next question that follows is:  how much do house 
prices increase by?  In the US, there is a well established body of empirical research 
that has evolved from this theoretical evidence on the cost impact of developer charges 
on new housing over the past 35+ years (Been, 2005, Nelson et al., 2008).  Review of 
this literature reveals however, it is a danger to assume that passing, or shifting of 
costs is at parity (ie. $1.00 extra for developer charges = $1.00 passed on or back).  The 
literture indicates that it is common for “over shifting” to occur, with home buyers 
paying a greater incremental increase in the cost of the new home (as compared to the 
cost of the developer charge) as developers seek compensation for the additional risk 
taken and return on costs (Campbell, 2004, Mathur et al., 2004, Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 
2006, Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004).   
 
Whilst the findings of the empirical research to date are consistent in quantifying a 
consistent “overshifting” of developer charges to housing prices, the methodologies 
used vary greatly, as does the extent of overshifting identified.  In these studies, a 
$1.00 developer charge is attributed to a price increase of as little as a $0.13 for the 
developed lot only (Evans-Cowley et al., 2005), $0.23 increase in new house price 
(Dresch and Sheffrin, 1997) and up to $3.58 increase in new house price (Singell and 
Lillydahl, 1990).  With the evolution of better specified models, the research in the last 
decade from the US indicates that for every $1.00 increase in developer charges, new 
housing costs increase $1.50 to $1.70 (Nelson et al., 2008).  This concept of “over 
 
 
 
Housing 
Markets & 
Economics 
36 
shifting” for housing is consistent across all of the empirical research dating back to 
the 1980’s.   
 
Until now, this debate has gone largely unanswered in Australia by the academic 
community.  Recently Gurran and colleagues considered the issue of planning costs 
and housing affordability from a broader qualitative perspective using case studies 
(Gurran et al., 2009, Ruming et al., 2011, Gurran et al., 2010, Gurran et al., 2008).  
These examine the impact of all government charges and planning regulations on 
housing costs in each of the three eastern seaboard States.  Amongst other findings, 
this research limits its findings on the impact of developer charges to concluding that 
all planning charges have increased at a greater and disproportionate rate to median 
house prices, however no empirical evidence of the direct impact of developer charges 
on house price increases is provided. 
 
The absence of empirical data on this house price effect is fuelling the debate in 
Australia as to whether developer charges do get passed on to home buyers or not.  
This is a significant gap in the Australian research, and this paper seeks to provide 
the first empirical study of its kind in Australia to address this gap.   
3. Methodology 
Hedonic price models based on multiple regression theory provide for differentiation of 
individual supply and demand attributes (vectors of characteristics whose prices are 
not independently observed) whilst controlling for heterogeneous characteristics that 
are commonly thought to contribute to house price such as location, neighbourhood, 
age, number of bedrooms and the like (Dougherty, 2011, Hill, 2012).   
 
Review of the empirical models used internationally to estimate the effect of developer 
charges on house prices suggests that the use of an ordinary least squares hedonic 
regression model is appropriate for this study.  The hedonic approach is a relatively 
straightforward method once the requisite data is acquired and transformed into the 
appropriate scale and format.  The relative simplicity of the hedonic approach is one of 
its strengths and hence why it has been in use since Rosen’s (1974) seminary work.  In 
building the model, a step-wise approach was adopted to test the theory of additional 
variables adding greater predictive qualities to the model.  Structural elements were 
regressed initially, with locational elements added in a second step, then the 
jurisdictional and (government) policy elements added in the final step.  The final 
model is indicated overleaf: 
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௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚଶܮ௜ ൅ ߚଷܬ௜ ൅ ߚସܩ௜൅	ݑ௜,௧ Equ. 1 
 
Where   
Pi,t =  sale price of house i in time period t 
Si =  Structural attributes of the house: lot area; number of bedrooms, bathrooms and car 
parking spaces, dummy for new or existing home  
Li =  Locational features of the house:  region and socio-economic suburb rankings 
Ji = Jurisdictional factors that might affect the price of a house: changes to household 
income levels; population growth; new housing supply; unemployment rate; 
construction cost index;  mortgage rates;  consumer confidence 
Gi = Government policy factors that might affect the price of the house: developer 
charges  
ݑ௜,௧ =  error term or noise in the model for the ith observation at time t. 
4. Data 
This study examines the effect of developer charges on both new and existing houses 
in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.  Brisbane is the State capital of Queensland and 
is the hub of South-East Queensland which is Australia’s third largest metropolitan 
region, comprising 3.1 million people, of which approximately 70% reside in the 
Greater Brisbane area, accounting for approximately half of the State’s population 
(ABS (Australian Bureau of Statistics), 2012).  The data used for this study includes a 
sample of suburbs in Brisbane’s northern growth corridor as well as the same in 
Brisbane’s southern growth corridor.  The study period for this research is from 2005 
to 2011.   
 
Full sales record data for all houses and vacant residential lots for the period 2005 to 
2011 in the local government areas in this study was provided by a commercial re-
seller of the state and local government sales records.  This provided the structural 
data including:  address, real property description, lot size, sale price, sale date 
(contract date), settlement date, number of bedrooms/bathrooms/carparks, zoning, sale 
type, land use, buyer and seller details.  Sales data was cleansed to remove:  non arms 
length transactions, part sales, multiple transaction sales, and court order 
transactions.  The sales with incomplete data were removed.  Data on the size of the 
house and the age of the house were not available.  To categorise each sale as a New or 
Existing house a data rule was established whereby any house which sold (or resold) 
within four years of the initial lot sale was deemed to be a New house salei.  Any house 
sale that did not meet these New house criteria, was categorised as an Existing house.   
 
Next locational data was considered. The data set supplied full address details for each 
sales record however, no GIS data was available.  In order to take factors such as some 
suburbs in the study areas being more or less desirable than others into consideration 
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the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ (“ABS”) Index of Relative Socio-economic 
Advantage and Disadvantage was utilised.  This index provides a 1 – 10 rating at a 
suburb level as a relative measure of socio-economic advantage and disadvantage.   
 
Jurisdictional data was sourced from the ABS web site, with the exception of data on 
the 30 year home mortgage rates, consumer sentiment and inflation, which was 
sourced from the Reserve Bank of Australia web site.  Where monthly or quarterly 
data existed, annual averages were derived (by calendar year).   Data on common 
supply and demand house price drivers were sought at a local government level 
(rather than State level) to ensure regional sub-market effects were suitably 
accommodated.   
 
The government policy variable that is relevant to house price over the study period is 
the developer charges.  Unfortunately, developer charge data is not readily available 
in Queensland and has been a limiting factor in the progression of this type of 
research.  In order to access such data, large private land developers were approached 
to supply developer charge data for their projects.  The developers that were 
approached supplied data on the developer charges levied on their projects in the 
study area.  The total developer charges applicable to a stage were divided by the 
number of lots in that stage to determine the charge per lot.  The applicable rate per 
annum was derived from the year the stage was released and sold and adopted as the 
average developer charge applicable in the study area.  A one year lag was applied to 
account for the time between development approval and completion of the project.    
 
The final data set for this study comprised of 4,699 new and 25,053 existing house sales 
in Brisbane from 2005 to 2011.  Table 1 describes the independent variables utilised in 
the model estimation.   Table 2 indicates the summary statistics for both the New and 
Existing data sets.  
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Table 1  Variable Legend 
Variable Definition 
IA_Price House price 
Structural Attributes 
Area Lot size in square metres 
Bedrooms Total number of bedrooms 
Bathrooms Total number of bathrooms 
Carparks Total number of car parking spaces 
Type Dummy variable indicating whether the house is Existing (0) or New (1) 
Locational Attributes 
SEIFA 
1-10  ranking of suburb as indicated by the Index of Relative Socio-economic 
Advantage and Disadvantage  
Region Dummy variable for Brisbane Northside (0) or Southside (1) 
Jurisdictional Attributes 
Year Time dummy for year of sale 
AC_Inc Percentage rate of change in population (LGA) 
AC_Pop Percentage increase in median household income (LGA) 
AC_Bul Percentage change in building approvals  (LGA) 
A_Upr Unemployment rate (LGA) 
A_Cci Construction cost index for Brisbane (capital city) 
A_Mgr Average 30 year mortgage rate (Australia) 
A_Css Consumer confidence index (Australia) 
Policy Attributes 
DC_1L Annual developer charge adopted per lot, lagged by one year 
LGA = data obtained at a local government area level 
Table 2  Summary Statistics –New and Existing Houses   
 New  Existing 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
IA_Price 523341.08 138858.869 462208.40 148276.713 
Area 575.6831 199.89158 708.5697 349.09909 
Bedrooms 3.93 .634 3.58 .784 
Bathrooms 2.09 .471 1.72 .659 
Carparks 1.96 .500 1.92 .776 
Type a a b b 
Region .39 .487 .48 .500 
SEIFA 8.28 1.994 7.07 2.513 
Year 2007.52 1.670 2007.63 1.731 
AC_Inc 5.0220 1.47187 4.9825 1.49349 
AC_Pop 2.8792 .71397 2.7444 .68466 
AC_Bul -2.7188 16.59528 -5.0676 16.67490 
A_Upr 3.4126 .99346 3.6197 .99980 
A_Cci 4.3238 2.67237 4.2087 2.65298 
A_Mgr 7.6020 .89738 7.5467 .93109 
A_Css 105.6387 8.51702 105.2292 8.47408 
DC_1L 11438.1166 4465.83988 12201.3322 4539.71973 
n 4699  25053  
a. Type = 1, b Type = 0 
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Step-Wise Process 
Separate models for both New and Existing houses were run to determine if a 
differential effect between new and existing housing was evident.  A step-wise 
approach was adopted to test the additional predictive value of the model upon the 
inclusion of more independent variables.  The structural elements were regressed 
initially, with locational elements added in a second step, then the jurisdictional and 
(government) policy elements added in the final step.  The results of the process using 
Brisbane New house data are indicated in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3   Step Wise Process Model Summary d – New Houses 
   Adj  Std Error of   Change  Statistics  
Model R R2 R2 Estimates R2 
Change
F  
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
change
1 .602b .363 .362 110910.394 .363 667.508 4 4694 .000
2 .657c .431 .430 104810.919 .069 188.411 3 4691 .000
3 .671d .451 .449 103083.167 .020 20.821 8 4683 .000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Carparks, Type (Structural) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Carparks, Type, Region, SEIFA, Year, 
(Structural + Locational) 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Carparks, Type, Region, SEIFA, Year,  
AC_Pop,AC_Bul,A_Upr,A_Cci,A_Mgr,A_Css,DC_1L (Structural+Locational+Jurisdictional+ Policy) 
d. Dependent Variable:  IA_Price 
 
The results of the process using Brisbane Existing house data are indicated in Table 3 
below. 
 
Table 4   Step Wise Process Model Summary d – Existing Houses 
   Adj  Std Error of   Change  Statistics  
Model R R2 R2 Estimates R2 
Change
F  
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
change
1 .687a .472 .472 107759.635 .472 5596.127 4 25048 .000
2 .750b .563 .562 98082.742 .091 1729.770 3 25045 .000
3 .764c .583 .583 95759.229 .021 154.767 8 25037 .000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Carparks, Type (Structural) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Carparks, Type, Region, SEIFA, Year, 
(Structural + Locational) 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Carparks, Type, Region, SEIFA, Year,  
AC_Pop,AC_Bul,A_Upr,A_Cci,A_Mgr,A_Css,DC_Ifc_1L 
(Structural+Locational+Jurisdictional+Policy) 
d. Dependent Variable:  IA_Price 
 
These findings indicate that the predictive qualities of the house price models improve 
as the additional independent variables are added, as would be expected, albeit with 
diminishing returns.  Incorporating all variables, an adjusted R2 of .45 and .58 is 
achieved for New and Existing houses respectively. 
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5. Results  
The regression results for New houses are provided in Table 5.  All outputs are of the 
expected sign and significance with the exception of building approvals (both sign and 
significance), unemployment (significance only) and consumer confidence (sign only).   
output of 4.694 and significance of .002.  This indicates that these results provide 
evidence that a $1.00 increase in developer charges increases new house prices in 
Brisbane by $4.69.   
 
Table 5  Regression Results – New Houses 
Model   Beta t Sig. Lower Bound* Upper Bound* 
1 (Constant) 37191.848 3.466 .001 16156.191 58227.505 
  Area 195.553 22.305 .000 178.365 212.741 
  Bedrooms 27913.613 8.441 .000 21430.178 34397.048 
  Bathrooms 113806.119 27.878 .000 105803.054 121809.183 
  Carparks 12963.587 3.435 .001 5565.084 20362.090 
  (Constant) 
-29036230.566 -
15.149 
.000 -32793836.87 -25278624.26 
2 Area 199.891 23.675 .000 183.338 216.443 
  Bedrooms 25227.309 8.007 .000 19050.826 31403.791 
  Bathrooms 103082.912 26.516 .000 95461.476 110704.348 
  Carparks 11579.638 3.245 .001 4584.681 18574.595 
  SEIFA 12029.572 15.396 .000 10497.725 13561.419 
  Year 14441.131 15.126 .000 12569.407 16312.855 
  Region 41703.515 12.521 .000 35173.778 48233.252 
  (Constant) -1231169.278 -.137 .891 -18909580.94 16447242.37 
  Area 193.080 23.103 .000 176.696 209.465 
3 Bedrooms 24003.477 7.737 .000 17921.101 30085.854 
  Bathrooms 102232.747 26.703 .000 94727.034 109738.461 
  Carparks 12434.172 3.539 .000 5545.413 19322.931 
  SEIFA 12442.444 16.109 .000 10928.161 13956.727 
  Year 777.255 .174 .862 -7984.808 9539.317 
  Region 89928.398 3.910 .000 44833.248 135023.549 
  AC_Inc 12479.622 2.409 .016 2321.766 22637.477 
  AC_Pop 16419.595 1.170 .242 -11083.955 43923.145 
  AC_Bul -1945.120 -2.429 .015 -3515.362 -374.878 
  A_Upr -54317.090 -2.563 .010 -95869.475 -12764.706 
  A_Cci 9469.512 1.683 .092 -1560.995 20500.019 
  A_Mgr -72085.602 -3.508 .000 -112373.233 -31797.971 
  A_Css 1283.543 1.402 .161 -511.572 3078.657 
  DC_1L 4.694 3.126 .002 1.750 7.638 
*95.0% Confidence Interval for Beta 
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The regression results for Existing houses are provided in Table 6.  All outputs are of 
the expected sign and significance at five percent with the exception of building 
approvals (both sign and significance), unemployment (significance only) and 
consumer confidence (sign only).  This indicates that these results provide evidence 
that a $1.00 increase in developer charges increases existing house prices in Brisbane 
by $3.56.   
 
 
Table 6  Regression Results – Existing Houses 
Model   Beta t Sig. Lower Bound* Upper Bound* 
1 (Constant) 76752.470 22.662 .000 70114.178 83390.762 
  Area 139.140 68.522 .000 135.160 143.120 
  Bedrooms 32926.410 29.167 .000 30713.692 35139.128 
  Bathrooms 87624.612 65.123 .000 84987.296 90261.928 
  Carparks 9567.893 10.267 .000 7741.338 11394.447 
  (Constant) -31795355.4 -42.39 .000 -33265479.3 -30325231 
2 Area 146.358 78.335 .000 142.696 150.020 
  Bedrooms 26521.479 25.704 .000 24499.095 28543.863 
  Bathrooms 68516.353 54.144 .000 66036.015 70996.692 
  Carparks 10029.803 11.761 .000 8358.246 11701.360 
  SEIFA 14724.433 54.739 .000 14197.195 15251.671 
  Year 15836.439 42.387 .000 15104.128 16568.749 
  Region 50179.764 37.402 .000 47550.117 52809.411 
  (Constant) -18532657.4 -5.277 .000 -25416832.2 -11648482 
  Area 145.258 79.592 .000 141.680 148.835 
3 Bedrooms 26462.432 26.268 .000 24487.873 28436.991 
  Bathrooms 68817.871 55.692 .000 66395.850 71239.892 
  Carparks 10378.336 12.461 .000 8745.863 12010.810 
  SEIFA 14749.258 56.156 .000 14234.448 15264.068 
  Year 9301.686 5.343 .000 5889.205 12714.167 
  Region 45712.234 5.336 .000 28921.032 62503.436 
  AC_Inc 4323.978 2.087 .037 262.205 8385.750 
  AC_Pop 16448.521 2.837 .005 5085.394 27811.647 
  AC_Bul 229.834 .757 .449 -365.021 824.689 
  A_Upr -2775.518 -.342 .732 -18677.966 13126.931 
  A_Cci 10471.111 4.756 .000 6156.101 14786.120 
  A_Mgr -27883.372 -3.412 .001 -43903.279 -11863.466 
  A_Css -705.090 -1.912 .056 -1428.071 17.890 
  DC_1L 3.565 6.266 .000 2.450 4.680 
*95.0% Confidence Interval  
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6. Findings 
This study provides the first empirical evidence that developer charges, after 
accounting for macroeconomic conditions and other factors that influence house price, 
contribute to increases in the price of both new and existing houses in Brisbane, 
Australia.  This evidence supports the theory that despite developer charges being 
levied on property developers, these supply chain costs are passed onto the end home 
buyer.  Not only are these fees being passed onto new house buyers, they are also 
being passed onto buyers of existing homes.  Further this research provides evidence of 
significant over passing for both new and existing houses in the order of 469% and 
356% respectively.   
 
In Brisbane, where the maximum adopted infrastructure charge for a new three (or 
more) bedroom home is $28,000, this one government charge could be adding between 
$130,000 and $100,000 to the price of housing in Brisbane (28,000*469%, 
28,000*356%).  Adopting an average initial cost impact of $115,000, over the life of a 
30 year mortgage this will amount to an additional $351,441 in total repayments, or 
an additional $976 per month (Commonwealth Bank, 2013) ii.   
 
Various reasons for overpassing have been hypothesised in the literature; however no 
studies have provided evidence in this regard.  A common proposition for the over 
shifting phenomenon is the suggestion that developer charges add additional 
uncertainties and delay costs in the approval process, resulting in developers 
recouping more than the cost of the fees alone as developers seek compensation for the 
additional risk taken and return on costs (Campbell, 2004, Mathur, 2003).  This 
overshifting can also be combined with back passing to land owners (Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessy, 2004), with developers requiring higher profit margins to compensate 
them for the additional uncertainty associated with a rapidly changing regulatory 
environment.  Further, any additional development costs are increased by construction 
period interest and other development costs determined as a percentage of the sale 
price (Singell and Lillydahl, 1990, Crowe, 2007).  So not only are developer charges 
passed directly onto homeowners, there is an overshifting effect to compensate 
developers firstly for the additional uncertainty (risk) and secondly a return of funds 
invested component, either for the developer, or its financier over the development 
period  (Ellickson and Been, 2005). 
 
Whilst this explanation appears intuitive and in line with common thinking, there are 
others who argue the opposite, suggesting that developer charges increase certainty.  
Nelson et al. (1992) supported by Nelson et al. (2008) contend that developer charges 
reduce uncertainty by virtue of timely provision of public infrastructure, that may 
expand the supply of buildable land.  Gurran et al. (2009) suggest that the negotiated 
approach in the UK reduces risks for developers.  This seems counter intuitive, with 
any unknown in the costing process adding uncertainty for developers.  This is further 
compounded by the unpredictable delays (and costs) incurred in the negotiation 
process (Bramley and Leishman, 2005, Chan, 2009).  
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The high on-passing ratio evident in this study could be a function of the uncertainty 
associated with the fully negotiated, rapidly increasing and opaque infrastructure 
charging regime in Brisbane at the time.  In the US studies, set fees per lot were 
scheduled with annual increases announced in advance.  Theory suggests that in a 
fully transparent system, such supply chain costs are able to be passed back to the 
land owner, and yet overpassing at a consistent level existed in all US studies 
undertaken.  Indeed Shaughnessy’s (2003) study on land price impacts suggested that 
back-passing and over-passing were occurring contemporaneously, albeit with weak 
evidence. 
 
Given this study is the first of its kind in Australia, it is acknowledged that it is 
subject to a number of limitations.  Developer charge data collection was a challenge 
for this project, and is likely to be a reason why work of this nature has remained 
unexamined up until now.  A further limitation of this study is associated with the 
categorisation of sales into New or Existing housing.  As discussed previously a data 
rule was established which required manual coding of more than 80,000 sales records 
from 2003 - 2011.  Any manual coding is subject to human error.  Future research 
would benefit from working closely with local authorities to gain access to more 
detailed infrastructure charge data, so that the associated house price effects can be 
more accurately estimated.   
7. Conclusion 
Housing affordability is at critical levels in Australia and the reasons for this are the 
subject of much policy debate.  Development industry bodies maintain that developer 
charges are a significant contributor to the supply-side cost drivers of increasing house 
prices.  In a climate where housing affordability is a policy objective for many 
governments, a clear understanding of the impacts these government charges have on 
the price of housing is imperative.   
 
To date the Australian academic community has not responded to this issue in an 
empirical manner.  This research provides the first empirical evidence of the impact of 
developer charges on house prices in Australia.  This research provides evidence in 
support of the proposition that not only are developer charges over passed to new 
home buyers but also to buyers of existing homes.  Thus the price inflationary effect of 
these developer charges are being felt by all home buyers across the community, 
resulting in increased mortgage repayments by close to $1000 per month.  These 
results are important as they will inform governments on the outcomes of growth 
management strategies on housing affordability, providing the first evidence of its 
kind in Australia.  
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